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Introduction: 
Supply  Shocks  and  Policy  Choices 
Exogenous  supply  disturbances  such  as the  recent 
Iraqi  oil shock  deliver  a double  blow  to the  economy. 
By  rendering  material  or  energy  inputs  scarcer  and 
dearer,  they  raise  production  costs  per  unit  of  out- 
put.  In so doing  they  discourage  production  and  raise 
product  prices.  The  resulting  rise  in the  general  price 
level  shrinks  the  buying  power  of  spenders’  money 
balances,  thus  reducing  the  aggregate  demand  for real 
output.  Real  activity  slackens  as  prices  rise. 
Of  course  the  adverse  price  and  output  effects  of 
a  supply  shock  would  hardly  be  expected  to  last 
forever.  For  the  depressed  levels  of  output  and 
employment  would  put  downward  pressure  on wage 
rates.  And  the  resulting  fall in wages  would  tend  to. 
countervail  the  impact  of dearer  energy  and  material 
inputs  on  production  costs,  thereby  restoring  aggre- 
gate  prices,  output,  and. employment  to  their  .pre- 
shock  levels.  If  wages  are  downwardly  sticky, 
Henry Thornton  (1760-1815) 
however,  such  adjustment  cannot  be  instantaneous. 
During  the  interim  the  economy  feels  the  effects  of 
the  shock.’ 
Because  supply  shocks  are  painful,  they  raise  the 
question  of the  appropriate  monetary  response.  What, 
‘if anything,  should  the  central  bank  do  to  counter 
the  adverse  price  and  output  effects  of  a  shock? 
Essentially  the  policymakers’  choices  are three.  They 
can leave  monetary  policy  unchanged  and  do nothing 
to mitigate  the  shock.  Alternatively  they  can  accom- 
modate  the  shock  with  expansionary  policy  in  an 
effort  to  dampen  its  depressive  output  effects. 
Finally,  they  can  employ  contractionary  policy  to 
reverse  the  price  rise  caused  by  the  shock.  Of  these 
alternatives,  expansionary  policy  runs  the  risk  of 
.’ For more on the conventional sticky wage analysis of supply 
shocks  and  their  policy  implications  see  Bruno  and  Sachs  (1985), 
DornbuSch  and  Fischer  (1984),  Feldstein  (1990),  Fischer  (1985), 
Gordon  (1981),  Mishkin  (1989),  Shapiro  (1987),  and  Solow 
(1980).  The  present  section  draws  heavily  from  these  sources. 
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contrast,  contractionary  policy  risks  worsening  the 
recession  caused  by  the  shock.  A policy  of holding 
the  money  stock  constant  of  course  avoids  these 
risks,  albeit  at the  cost  of ameliorating  neither  of the 
shock’s  adverse  effects. 
Which  of  the  foregoing  alternatives  will  the 
policymakers  select?  Their  choice  will  depend  to 
some  degree  on their  belief  in the  neutrality  or non- 
neutrality  of money  stock  changes  on real output  and 
employment.  Those  believing  in money’s  short-  as 
well as long-run  neutrality  will opt  for contractionary 
policy.  They  will  reason  that  if money  has  no  real 
effects,  then  expansionary  policy  is  powerless  to 
stimulate  real activity  whereas  contractionary  policy 
can stabilize  prices  at their  pre-shock  level at the  cost 
of no  additional  lost  output  and  employment.  Since 
stable  prices  reduce  business  risk  and  uncertainty, 
contractionary  policy  will  be  judged  the  best. 
Contrariwise,  policymakers  believing  in money’s 
short-run  non-neutrality  will opt  either  for expansion- 
ary or constant  money-stock  policies.  Expansionary 
policy  will  be  selected  if its  beneficial  output  and 
employment  effects  are  judged  to  exceed  its  infla- 
tion  costs.  Only  if those  costs  are  seen  to  outweigh 
the  benefits  will expansionary  policy  be  rejected  in 
favor  of constant  money-stock  policy.  Seldom  will 
contractionary  policy  be  chosen  by  believers  in 
money’s  non-neutrality.  Given  that  such  policy 
produces  additional  output  losses  on  top  of  those 
already  caused  by  the  shock,  it will be  regarded  as 
too  costly  to  conduct. 
That  supply  shocks  may require  different  monetary 
responses  depending  on  the  neutrality  or  non- 
neutrality  of  money  is  hardly  a  new  idea.  It  was 
thoroughly  established  in  the  writings  of  David 
Ricardo  and  Henry  Thornton  in the  first  decade  of 
the  nineteenth  century.  Ricardo,  a strict  believer  in 
money’s  long-  and  short-run  neutrality  with  respect 
to output  and employment,  argued  that  supply shocks 
should  be  countered  with  monetary  contraction.z 
2 Ricardo  was  not  always  consistent  on  the  neutrality  proposi- 
tion.  In  certain  isolated  passages  (for example,  WWS,  III,  94) 
he  remarked  that  sudden  and  sharp  contraction  can  bring  pain- 
ful  real  effects  which  only  gradual  contraction  can  avoid.  His 
remarks  have  been  interpreted  as  a rejection  of the  short-run 
neutrality  proposition  [Ahiakpor  (1985),  Hollander  (1979)J. More 
likely  they  are  mere  exceptions  or  minor  qualifications  to  it 
[de Vivo (1987),  p.  189), O’Brien (1981,  p.  371),  Peake  (1978)]. 
Generally  he  adhered  to the  neutrality  proposition  and  made  no 
distinction  between  the  short  run  and  the  long.  The  propo- 
sition’s  prevalence  in the  bulk  of his  monetary  writing  supports 
O’Brien’s  (1975,  p.  164) judgment  that  “Ricardo,  focusing  as 
usual  on  successive  periods  of long-run  equilibrium,  denied  the 
damage  of deflation  and  the  stimulating  effect  of rising  prices.” 
Thornton,  a  believer  in  money’s  short-run  non- 
neutrality,  opposed  monetary  contraction  and  argued 
instead  that  the  money  stock  should  be  held  con- 
stant  in the  face of supply  shocks.  Both parties  agreed 
that  money  has  no long-run  (permanent)  real effects. 
On  this  matter  Thornton  was  every  bit  as  much  a 
strict  classical  quantity  theorist  as Ricardo.  At  issue 
was  the  short-run  (temporary)  non-neutrality  of 
money.  The  following  paragraphs  show  how  this 
issue  influenced  the  respective  policy  prescriptions 
of Ricardo  and Thornton  just  as it undoubtedly  con- 
tinues  to  influence  the  Fed’s  response  to  oil shocks 
today. 
David  Ricardo’s  Analysis 
Textbook  allegations  to  the  contrary,  economic 
analysis  of supply  shocks  and the  appropriate  policy 
response  did  not  begin  with  the  OPEC  price  hikes 
of 1973-74.3  As early  as the  first decade  of the  nine- 
teenth  century,  David  Ricardo  (1772-1823)  and 
Henry  Thornton  (1760-  18 1  S),  the  preeminent 
monetary  theorists  of the  English  Classical  School, 
analyzed  such  shocks  in the  form  of harvest  failures. 
They  were  particularly  concerned  with  how  to  deal 
with  external  gold  drains  triggered  by  the  impact  of 
bad harvests  on domestic  monetary  requirements  and 
the  balance  of payments.  At issue  was whether  such 
drains  should  be  allowed  to  contract  the  money 
supply  and bring  prices  back  to their  pre-shock  level. 
Ricardo  argued  that  they  should.  Assuming  a given 
initial  money  stock,  his  argument  was  that  English 
harvest  failures  would,  by  reducing  real  output  and 
thus  raising general  prices,  lower money’s  purchasing 
power  in  England  relative  to  its  purchasing  power 
abroad. Traders  would then find it advantageous  to ship 
monetary  gold  abroad  to where  its value  was highest. 
Ricardo  maintained  that the resulting  gold drain should 
be  allowed  to contract  the  English  money  stock  until 
prices fell to their pre-shock  level. In terms  of the equa- 
tion of exchange  P  = MVIQ,  with velocity V constant, 
the  shock-induced  fall in real  output  Q  requires  an 
equiproportionate  reduction  in money  M to stabilize 
prices  P  at  their  pre-shock  level4  As  Ricardo  put 
3 See  Barro  (1990,  p.  114)  and  Gordon  (1981,  p.  17) for  text- 
book  statements  identifying  1973 as the  year when  supply-shock 
analysis  became  important  to  macroeconomists. 
4 Ricardo’s  use  of the  exchange  equation  to  analyze  aggregate 
price  determination  is  well  known.  In  his  notes  on  Jeremy 
Bentham’s  manuscript  “Sur  Les  Prix”  he  wrote:  “May  we  not 
put  the  mass  of commodities  of all sorts  on  one  side  of the 
%&--and  the  amount  of money  multiplied  by  the  rapidity  of 
its  circulation  on  the  other.  Is  not  this  in all cases  the  regulator 
of prices?”  (K&r,  III,  3 11) Here  is a precise  verbal  statement 
of  the  equation  P  =  MVIQ. 
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H&h Price  of But&n, A Proof  of the Depreciation  of Bank 
Notes: 
England,  in  consequence  of  a  bad  harvest,  would  come 
under  the  case  .  .  . of a country  having  been  deprived  of 
a  part  of  its  commodities,  and  therefore  requiring  a 
diminished  amount  of  circulating  medium.  The  currency 
which  was  before  equal  to her payments  would  now  become 
superabundant  and  relatively  cheap,  in  . . . proportion  . . . 
of her  diminished  production;  the  exportation  of this  sum, 
therefore,  would  restore  the  value  of her  currency  to  the 
value  of the  currencies  of other  countries  (Wok,  III,  106). 
In  prescribing  monetary  contraction,  Ricardo 
assumed  money’s  output  and  employment  effects 
were  negligible  so that  contraction  would  not  amplify 
the  depressive  impact  of  the  shock.  His  policy 
prescription  manifested  his belief  in the  neutrality  of 
money. 
That  same  belief  led  him  to  reject  expansionary 
remedies.  Such  remedies  purport  to  stimulate  pro- 
duction  thereby  counteracting,  wholly  or  partially, 
the  output  losses  due to the  shock.  In Ricardo’s  view, 
however,  monetary  accommodation  could  no  more 
relieve  the  real  effects  of a  shock  than  contraction 
could  exacerbate  them.  “Money,”  he  said,  “cannot 
call forth  goods”  (J#%&  III,  301).  Likewise,  when 
asked  to give his opinion  on the  output  stimulus  pro- 
vided  by  “fictitious  capital,”  a  then-current 
euphemism  for monetary  expansion,  Ricardo  replied: 
“I believe  that  on this Subject  I differ from most  other 
People.  I do not  think  that  any  Stimulus  is given  to 
Production  by  the  Use  of fictitious  Capital,  as  it  is 
called,”  arising  from  extra  issues  of  money  (K&r, 
V,  446). 
To  be  effective,  such  overissue  must  inflate 
product  prices  faster  than  it does  money  wages  with 
the  resulting  fall in real wages  and  corresponding  rise 
in real profits  inducing  employers  to hire  extra  labor 
to  expand  production.  According  to  Ricardo, 
however,  money  wage  flexibility  prevents  this  out- 
come.  Indeed,  wages  adjust  virtually  as  rapidly  as 
prices  to  monetary  change  so  that  lags  of  wages 
behind  prices  are but  fleeting  phenomena.  In his own 
words: 
There  is  but  one  way  in  which  an  increase  of money  no 
matter  how  it be  introduced  into  the  society,  can  augment 
riches,  viz  at  the  expense  of  the  wages  of  labour;  till  the 
wages  of labour  have  found  their  level  with  the  increased 
prices  which  the  commodities  will have  experienced,  there 
will  be  so  much  additional  revenue  to  the  manufacturer 
and  farmer;  they  will  obtain  an  increased  price  for  their 
commodities,  and  can  whilst  wages  do not  increase  employ 
an  additional  number  of  hands,  so  that  the  real  riches  of 
the  country  will  be  somewhat  augmented.  A  productive 
labourer  will  produce  something  more  than  before  rela- 
tively  to  his  consumption,  but  this  con  be  otdy  of monm- 
tory  duration  (WorRr, III,  318-19,  emphasis  added). 
In  short,  wage-price  flexibility  renders  monetary 
stimulus  powerless  to  cushion  real  shocks. 
Ricardo  Diagrammed 
Writing  more  than  sixty  years  before  the  inven- 
tion  of  supply  and  demand  curves,  Ricardo  ex- 
pressed  himself  in  words  and  numerical  examples 
rather  than  in  geometrical  diagrams.  Nevertheless 
it  may  be  useful  to  illustrate  his  analysis  with  the 
aid  of  conventional  aggregate  demand  and  supply 
schedules  located  in  price-output  space  (see 
Figure  1). Drawn  for a given  nominal  money  stock, 
the  aggregate  demand  schedule  slopes  downward 
because  of a real balance  effect  on expenditure:  a fall 
in  prices  raises  real  cash  balances  thereby  increas- 
ing  the  quantity  of goods  demanded.  The  vertical 
aggregate  supply  schedule  reflects  Ricardds  assump- 
tion  of the  neutrality  of money:  given  perfect  wage- 
price  flexibility,  the  quantity  of  output  supplied  is 
invariant  to  changes  in  money  and  hence  prices. 
Starting  from  initial demand-supply  equilibrium  at 
point  A, a harvest  failure  shifts  the  aggregate  supply 
schedule  to  the  left.  Equilibrium  moves  to  point  B 
along  the  initial  demand  schedule  yielding  lower 
output  and  higher  prices.  Monetary  contraction  then 
shifts  the  aggregate  demand  schedule  downward. 
Equilibrium  moves  to  point  C  where  prices  are 
restored  to their  pre-shock  level.  Monetary  contrac- 
tion  has  no  effect  on  output  but  stabilizes  prices  at 
their  pre-shock  level. 
By the  same  token,  monetary  expansion  and  the 
resulting  rightward  shift  in the  demand  curve  would 
do  nothing  to  counter  the  output  loss  of the  shock. 
It would  merely  move  the  price level to a higher  point 
along  the  shock-displaced  supply  curve  with  no 
corresponding  rise  in output.  Since  price  stability  in 
the  face  of  the  shock  can  be  costlessly  attained 
whereas  monetary  expansion  and inflated  prices  yield 
no  benefits,  contractionary  policy  is  preferred. 
Henry  Thornton’s  Analysis 
Opposed  to Ricardo  was Henry  Thornton,  banker, 
member  of Parliament,  philanthropist  who  before  his 
marriage  donated  six-sevenths  of  his  considerable 
income  to charity  and  at least  one-fourth  thereafter, 
and  author  of the  classic  An Enpiry  into the Nature 
and Effects  of the Paper Cmdt  of G-eat Britain ( 1802). 
Thornton  objected  to  Ricardo’s  prescription  of 
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Along  the  aggregate  demand  curve,  rising  prices  shrink 
real  cash  balances  and  thus  the  quantity  of  goods  de- 
manded.  Perfect  wage-price  flexibility  fixes  the  aggregate 
supply  curve  at the  actual  (and  potential)  level  of output. 
Point  A denotes  initial  supply-demand  equilibrium.  A crop 
failure  shifts  the  supply  curve  leftward.  Equilibrium  moves 
to  point  B with  lower  output  and  higher  prices.  Monetary 
contraction  then  shifts  the  demand  curve  downward. 
Equilibrium  moves  to  point  C where  prices  are  stabilized 
at their  pre-shock  level  with  no  additional  loss  of  output. 
Ricardo’s  conclusion:  Since  price  stability  can  be  cost- 
lessly  attained,  crop  failures  should  be  countered  with 
monetary  contraction. 
monetary  contraction.  He  argued  that  at  a  very 
minimum  the  money  stock  should  be  held  constant 
in  the  face  of  real  shocks.  He  agreed  that  harvest 
failures and raw material  shortages  would,  by boosting 
production  costs,  act to raise prices.  “[B]ad harvests,” 
he wrote,  “by raising the price  of bread,  have  in some 
degree  lifted up that  of labour,  and of all commodities. 
Our  prices  may  have  also been  partly  augmented  by 
the  enhancement  of the  cost  of raw materials  brought 
from  other  countries”  (1802,  p.  263). 
Besides  raising  prices,  crop  failures,  Thornton 
noted,  would  necessitate  extraordinary  imports  of 
food  paid  for  by  exports  of monetary  gold.  But  he 
did not  agree  with  Ricardo  that  the  gold  drain  should 
be  allowed  to  contract  the  money  stock.  Believing 
as he  did  in the  short-run  non-neutrality  of money, 
Thornton  was  convinced  that  monetary  contraction 
was hardly the, proper  way to deal with adverse  supply 
shocks,  He  thought  that  money  wages  were  sticky 
and  adjusted  sluggishly  in response  to price  falls such 
that  when  those  falls occurred  real wages  would  rise 
to inhibit  economic  activity.  For  this reason  he main- 
tained  that  monetary  contraction  risked  the  danger 
of  disrupting  markets  and  causing  further  falls  in 
output  and  employment.  As  he  put  it  in  his  Paper 
Cmdit, monetary  contraction  and  the  resulting 
diminution  in  the price  of  manufactures  .  .  .  may  also,  if 
carried  very  far,  produce  a  suspension  of  the  labour  of 
those  who  fabricate  them.  The  masters  naturally  turn  off 
their  hands  when  they  find  their  article  selling  exceedingly 
ill.  It  is  true,  that  if we  could  suppose  the  diminution  of 
bank  paper  to produce  permanently  a diminution  in the value 
of  all  articles  whatsoever,  and  a  diminution,  as  it  would 
then  be  fair  that  it  should  do,  in  the  rate  of  wages  also, 
the  encouragement  to  future  manufactures  would  be  the 
same,  though  there  would  be  a loss  on  the  stock  in  hand. 
The  tendency,  however,  of  a  very  great  and  sudden 
reduction  of the  accustomed  number  of bank  notes,  is  to 
create  an WUSUO~  and  temporary  distress,  and  a fall of price 
arising  from  that  distress.  But  a fall arising  from  temporary 
distress,  will  be  attended  probably  with  no  correspondent 
fall  in  the  rate  of  wages;  for  the  fall  of  price,  and  the 
distress,  will  be  understood  to  be  temporary,  and  the  rate 
of wages,  we  know,  is not  so variable  as the  price  of goods. 
There  is reason,  therefore,  to  fear  that  the  unnatural  and 
extraordinary  low  price  arising  from  the  sort  of distress  of 
which  we  now  speak,  would  occasion  much  discouragement 
of  the  fabrication  of  manufactures  (1802,  pp.  118-19). 
To  avoid  this  danger,  he  favored  offsetting  or 
sterilizing  the  gold  outflow  with  compensating  note 
issues  by the  Bank  of England.  The  additional  paper 
would  go  to  replace  the  departed  gold,  thus  main- 
taining  constancy  in the  money  stock.  He  was  even 
willing  to  risk  temporary  suspension  of  the  gold 
standard  rather  than  contract  the  money  supply  in 
the  face  of supply  shocks.  To  him,  inconvertibility 
and the  consequent  inability  to redeem  paper  in gold 
at a fixed price on demand  was preferable  to monetary 
contraction.  Particularly  so when  such  contraction, 
by  disrupting  real  activity,  would  impair  the 
economy’s  ability  to  generate  export  surpluses  that 
would  be  paid  for  by  specie  inflows  upon  the  post- 
shock  return  to  gold.  To  put  the  economy  through 
the  wringer  of monetary  contraction,  he  said,  is to 
compel 
the  manufacturer,  on  account  of  the  unusual  scarcity  of 
money  .  .  . to  slacken,  if not  suspend,  his  operations.  To 
inflict  such  a pressure  on  the  mercantile  world  as  neces- 
sarily  causes  an  intermission  of  manufacturing  labour,  is 
obviously  not  the  way to  increase  that  exportable  produce, 
by the  excess  of which,  above  the  imported  articles,  gold  is 
to  be  brought  into  the  country  (1802,  p.  118). 
Sources  of  Non-Neutrality 
Although  Thornton  opposed  monetary  contrac- 
tion,  he  did  not  go  to  the  opposite  extreme  and 
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modate  supply  shocks.  To  be sure,  he admitted  that 
such  expansion  could  stimulate  output  and  employ- 
ment  temporarily,  thus  dampening  the  real  effects 
of  the  shocks.  These  stimulative  effects,  he  said, 
came  from  three  sources. 
First  were  sellers’  efforts  to  maintain  fixed 
inventory-to-sales  ratios.  Their  efforts,  which  ensured 
that  any  money-induced  rise  in  sales  would  be 
matched  by  a corresponding  rise  in production  for 
inventory,  were  described  by  Thornton  as follows: 
It may be  said  . . . and  not  untruly,  that  an encreased  issue 
of  paper  tends  to  produce  a  more  brisk  demand  for  the 
existing  goods,  and  a somewhat  more  prompt  consumption 
of  them;  that  the  more  prompt  consumption  supposes  a 
diminution  of  the  ordinary  stock,  and  the  application  of 
that  part  of it, which  is consumed,  to  the  purpose  of giving 
life  to  fresh  industry;  that  the  fresh  industry  thus  excited 
will  be  the  means  of  gradually  creating  additional  stock, 
which  will serve  to replace  the  stock  by which  the  industry 
had  been  supported;  and  that  the  new  circulating  medium 
will,  in this  manner,  create  for itself much  new  employment 
(1802,  p.  237). 
Second  was lagged  wage  adjustment  which  ensured 
that  a  monetary  stimulus  would  temporarily  raise 
prices  relative  to  wages.  As  pointed  out  by  Jurg 
Niehans  (1990,  p.  108),  Thornton  held  that  wages 
were  set for extended  periods  of time  whereas  prices 
related  to instantaneous  transactions.  This  meant  that 
wages  were  less  volatile  than  prices  and  thus  less 
responsive  to  monetary  impulses.  Consequently 
monetary  expansion  would  produce  a larger  initial 
rise  of prices  than  wages.  The  resulting  fall in  real 
wages  would  spur  real  output  and  employment. 
Third  was  the  shift  in  real  income  from  wage 
earners  to profit  recipients  caused  by the  lag of wages 
behind  prices.  Because  profit  recipients  tended  to 
save  and invest  more  than  wage  earners,  this  income 
shift would  encourage  capital  formation  thus  increas- 
ing actual  and capacity  real output.  Here  is the  origin 
of the  famousJbrcedsaGngdo&~e  according  to which 
the  redistributive  effects  of inflation  divert  resources 
from  consumption  to  investment.  Of  these  forced 
saving  effects,  Thornton  (1802,  p.  239)  wrote: 
It  must  be  also  admitted,  that,  provided  we  assume  an 
excessive  issue  of paper  to lift up,  as it may  for a time,  the 
cost  of goods  though  not  the  price  of labour,  some  augmen- 
tation  of  stock  will  be  the  consequence;  for  the  labourer, 
according  to  this  supposition,  may  be  forced  by  his  neces- 
sity  to consume  fewer  articles,  though  he  may  exercise  the 
same  industry  (1802,  p.  239). 
Thornton  likewise  alluded  to  the  possibility  of  “a 
similar  defalcation  of the  revenue  of the  unproduc- 
tive  members  of the  society,”  namely  fixed-income 
recipients.  Owing  to  these  forced  saving  effects  he 
concluded  that  “It has thus  been  admitted  that  paper 
possesses  the  faculty  of  enlarging  the  quantity  of 
commodities  by  giving  life  to  some  new  industry” 
(p.  239). 
Nevertheless,  he  opposed  pursuing  these  expan- 
sionary  real  effects  because  of the  high  inflationary 
costs  of doing  so.  Indeed  he  condemned  all forced 
saving  and  the  accompanying  price  inflation  as 
“attended  with a proportionate  hardship  and injustice” 
(p.  239).  To  him,  inflation  was  an  unmitigated  evil 
to  be  avoided  at all costs,  even  if it meant  giving  up 
the  associated  gains  in  output  and  employment. 
These  gains,  he  thought,  could  never  compensate 
for  the  uncertainty,  injustice,  and  social  discontent 
generated  by  inflation.  In short,  he  favored  a policy 
of holding  the  money  stock  constant  on the  grounds 
that  an  accommodative  policy’s  inflationary  costs 
would  far exceed  its output  and employment  benefits. 
Thornton  D&rammed 
Thornton’s  analysis,  like Ricardo’s,  can be depicted 
with  aggregate  demand  and  supply  schedules  (see 
Figure  2).  Thornton’s  aggregate  supply  schedule, 
however,  differs  from  Ricardo’s.  As  noted  above, 
Ricardo’s  supply  schedule  is vertical  throughout  its 
range,  reflecting  his  assumption  of complete  wage- 
price  flexibility  such  that  changes  in  aggregate  de- 
mand  have  no influence  on output  and  employment. 
By contrast,  Thornton’s  supply  schedule  slopes  up- 
ward  to  the  point  of full employment,  reflecting  his 
assumption  that  higher  prices  operating  through  wage 
lags and  forced-saving  effects  induce  higher  levels  of 
output  and  employment.  In  his  own  words: 
. . . additional  industry  will  be  one  effect  of  an  extraordi- 
nary  emission  of paper,  a rise  in the  cost  of articles  will be 
another. 
Probably  no  small  part  of that  industry  which  is excited 
by  new  paper  is produced  through  the  very  means  of the 
enhancement  of the  cost  of commodities  (180’2, p.  237). 
In  short,  money-induced  inflation  stimulates  out- 
put  along  the  positively  sloping  portion  of  the 
supply  schedule.  Provided  the  economy  operates  in 
this  range,  output  gains  are  possible.  Only  at  the 
economy’s  absolute  full-capacity  level  of output  are 
these  gains  impossible  to  obtain.  There  Thornton’s 
supply  schedule  becomes  vertical  (perfectly  inelastic). 
At  that  point: 
. . . it  is  obvious,  that  the  antecedently  idle  persons  to 
whom  we  may  suppose  the  new  capital  to give  employ,  are 
limited  in  number;  and  that,  therefore,  if  the  encreased 
[monetary]  issue  is indefinite,  it will set  to work  labourers, 
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Aggregate  supply  becomes  perfectly  inelastic  at  full 
employment.  Point  A denotes  initial  equilibrium.  A harvest 
failure  shifts  the  supply  curve  to the  left.  Equilibrium  moves 
to  point  B with  lower  output  and  higher  prices.  Monetary 
contraction  would  shift  the  demand  curve  downward  with 
equilibrium  moving  to  point  C.  There  prices  would  be 
stabilized  at  their  pre-shock  level  at  the  cost  of  extra 
output  losses.  Alternatively,  monetary  expansion  would 
shift  the  demand  curve  upward.  Equilibrium  would  move 
to point  D. There  output  would  be stabilized  at its pm-shock 
level  at the  cost  of a further  rise  in  price.  To Thornton,  the 
costs  of  monetary  contraction  and  expansion  rendered 
both  actions  unacceptable.  His  advice:  Hold  the  money 
stock  constant  when  supply  shocks  occur.  Then  rely  on 
wage  adjustment  and/or  self-reversal  of  the  shocks  to 
restore  equilibrium  to  point  A. 
of whom  a part  will be  drawn  from  other,  and,  perhaps,  no 
less  useful  occupations.  It  may  be  inferred  from  this  con- 
sideration,  that  there  are some  bounds  to the  benefit  which 
is to  be  derived  from  an  augmentation  of paper;  and,  also, 
that  a liberal,  or,  at  most,  a large  encrease  of it,  will  have 
all the  advantageous  effects  of the  most  extravagant  emission 
(1802,  p.  236). 
To  summarize,  for  Thornton  the  classical 
neutrality-of-money  proposition  holds only at absolute 
full employment.  Short  of that  point  non-neutrality 
prevails.  Note  also that  the  positively  sloped  portion 
of Thornton’s  supply  schedule  is drawn  for  a given 
price  of food  and  raw  materials:  rises  in  these  par- 
ticular  prices  shift  the  curve  upward  and  to  the  left. 
Thus  starting  from  initial  equilibrium  at point  A, 
suppose  a harvest  failure  or  other  real  shock  shifts 
the  supply  schedule  to  the  left  thereby  establishing 
a  new  equilibrium  at  point  B  with  higher  general 
prices  and  lower  real  output.  Monetary  contraction 
could,  by shifting  the  aggregate  demand  curve  down 
and to the  left,  restore  prices  to their  pre-shock  level 
at  point  C.  But  output  would  be  depressed  below 
its already  low level produced  by the  shock.  Because 
of this depressive  effect,  monetary  contraction  should 
be  avoided. 
Alternatively,  monetary  expansion  could,  by shift- 
ing  the  demand  curve  up  and  to  the  right,  stabilize 
real  output  at  its  pre-shock  level.  But  such  output 
stabilization  would  involve  a  costly  further  price 
rise  to  point  D.  If  the  price  rise  generated  addi- 
tional  uncertainty,  injustice,  and  social  discontent 
whose  costs  exceeded  the  benefits  of output  stabili- 
zation  then  accommodative  policy  should  not  be 
undertaken. 
Since  neither  monetary  contraction  nor  monetary 
expansion  are  desirable  alternatives,  it follows  from 
Thornton’s  analysis  that  the  money  stock  should  be 
held  constant  in face  of the  shock.  In the  long  run, 
equilibrium  will in any  case  return  to point  A as the 
shock  proves  to  be  temporary  and/or  wages  and 
prices  fully adjust  to  clear  the  markets  for labor  and 
output.  A  policy  of  maintaining  a  constant  money 
stock  allows  this  self-equilibration  process  to  occur 
naturally  without  intervention.  It  does  not  exacer- 
bate  the  temporary  price  or  output  effects  of  the 
shock.  True,  it  does  not  ameliorate  these  effects 
either.  But  they  will  be  relatively  small  and  short- 
lived  if the  wage-price  adjustment  mechanism  works 
reasonably  smoothly  as Thornton  thought  it would. 
Conclusion 
The  Ricardo-Thornton  exchange  taught  that 
policymakers  can  respond  to  supply  shocks  either 
with  monetary  contraction,  with  accommodative 
monetary  expansion,  or with  a constant  money-stock 
policy.  These  alternatives  define  the  set  of feasible 
policy  choices  to  this  very  day.  Given  their  rele- 
vancy,  which  alternative  should  the  Fed  choose  to 
counter  the  effects  of  any  future  oil  shock? 
Clearly  it should  respond  with  Ricardian  monetary 
contraction  if money  affects  only prices  and  not  real 
output.  Conversely  it should  respond  with  monetary 
expansion  if money  temporarily  stimulates  output 
and  the  resulting  social  benefits  exceed  the  costs  of 
higher  prices.  Lastly  it should  respond  with  Thorn- 
ton’s  constant  money-stock  policy  if the  beneficial 
output  effects  of expansion  would  be  exceeded  by 
its  inflationary  costs. 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  23 Since,  contrary  to  Ricardo’s  belief,  money-stock 
changes  always  seem  to  entail  temporary  real  out- 
put  and employment  effects,5 the  Fed’s choice  would 
s In  addition  to  the  sources  of  non-neutrality  identified  by 
Thornton  in his Pazxr Credit. such  real effects  mav  stem  (1) from 
lags  in nominal  inierest  rates  behind  inflation  so  that  real  rates 
change,  (2)  from  imperfect  information  and  the  resulting  con- 
fusion  of monetary  shocks  for relative  price  ones  calling  for real 
adjustments,  and  (3) from  long-term  contracts  that  prevent  the 
private  sector  from  responding  to disturbances  as quickly  as the 
policymakers.  Of  these,  Thornton  mentions  the  first  in  his 
y3ay$)  18 11 parliamentary  speech  on  the  Bullion  Report  (pp. 
probably  narrow  to Thornton’s  constant  money-stock 
or  accommodative  policies.  Of  these,  Thornton’s 
policy  appears  to  be  the  more  prudent  choice. 
Especially  so  as  oil  shocks  may  prove  to  be  self- 
reversing  and  monetary  accommodation  today  could 
generate  expectations  of similar  accommodation  in 
all  future  episodes  contrary  to  the  Fed’s  goal  of 
achieving  long-run  price  stability.  These  considera- 
tions  strongly  suggest  the  advisability  of Thornton’s 
neutral  or constant  money-stock  response  to supply 
shocks. 
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